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Abstract 
Recent theories on cognitive science have stressed the significance of moral intuition 
as a counter to and complementary part of moral reasoning in decision making. Thus, 
the aim of this paper is to create an integrated framework that can account for both 
intuitive and reflective cognitive processes, in order to explore the antecedents of 
ethical decision making. To do that, we build on Scholasticism, an important medieval 
school of thought from which descends the main pillars of the modern Catholic social 
doctrine. Particularly, the focus will be on the scholastic concept of synderesis, which 
is an innate human faculty that constantly inclines decision makers toward universal 
moral principles. Managerial implications are discussed, stressing how a rediscovery 
of decision makers’ intuitive moral judgments could be relevant in the reflective 
thinking practice of managers’ ethical reasoning, thus saving them from rational 
insensitivity to ethical dilemmas. 
 
Keywords: Ethical decision making; Dual processing theory; Intuition; Emotion; 
Cognition; Synderesis. 
 
Introduction 
 
Following recent corporate scandals in the global economic scenario, research on 
ethical behavior has increasingly developed within the general area of business. In 
particular, ethical decision making has progressively gained relevance in the 
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management literature (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008). A comprehensive body 
of research has been produced, either with a theoretical or an empirical approach (for 
an extensive review of this subject see, for example, Craft, 2013; Ford and 
Richardson, 1994; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). A primary and central element of 
all this body of literature mainly remains a rationalist and cognitive approach, among 
which Rest’s model of ethical decision making (1986) is one of the most cited specific 
frameworks. Building upon this, a variety of theoretically positive and descriptive 
models of ethical decision making have been proposed, all pointing to a predominance 
of rational processes (e.g. Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 
1991; Treviño, 1986). In such models, intuition and emotions are set apart or 
completely disregarded, and for this reason the rationalist approach seems to encounter 
limitations and shortfalls, especially in uncertain, unexpected, and dynamic contexts 
(Groves et al., 2008; Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015; Treviño et al., 2006). In such 
circumstances, decision makers rely heavily on their ‘gut feelings’, emotions and 
intuitive mental processes (Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Zhong, 2011). For this reason, 
social psychologists and business scholars have recently rediscovered the importance 
of the emotive, instinctive, and intuitive reactions of decision makers (Dane and Pratt, 
2007; Haidt, 2001), a claim that is traditionally supported by intuition-based models of 
human cognition (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to say that these intuitive and emotional processes, which 
can be summarized in the expression moral intuition, deeply influence the decision 
maker in such contexts (Provis, 2015). In contrast, conscious and rational processes, 
which can be summarized in the expression moral reasoning, in such situations may 
instead occur in a later phase to offer a ‘rationale’ or a ‘sense’ for behaviors and 
decisions undertaken (Haidt, 2001). 
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Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to propose an integrated theoretical framework 
for ethical decision making that is able to take into a better account intuitive processes 
or moral intuition and how such processes can be blended into the traditional rational 
approach. Although a few scholars have tried to shed some light on this aspect, which 
is considered a pre-stage of the cognitive process (Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; 
Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005), such a theme remains 
scarcely investigated. For this purpose, we specifically use the concept of synderesis, a 
significant element of the scholastic theory on human morality and conscience 
(Aquinas, 1265-1274; 1947; Bonaventure, 1259; 1956), a Catholic school of thought 
which has deeply influenced modern Christian social doctrine tradition (e.g. see 
Benedict XVI, On Conscience, 2007; Melé, 2016). The concept refers to an innate 
human habit that fosters moral judgment and triggers the virtue of practical reason, as 
specified by recent managerial literature (Celano, 2013; Das Neves and Melé, 2013; 
Dierksmeier and Celano, 2012). 
Within this concept, we want to contribute to the traditional virtue ethics debate that 
has frequently addressed the problem of ethical decision making (Arjoon, 2010; 
Bastons, 2008; Melé, 2010), but mainly with intrinsic assumptions of rationalist 
rationales (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986). Thus, the research enlarges the debate by 
deepening the role of synderesis in the instinctive, direct, and automatic formation of 
moral intuition and its outcomes, i.e. intuitive moral judgments, showing also why this 
approach is better than other possible explanations of the phenomenon. We propose an 
integrated framework of ethical decision making that blends the two traditionally 
opposed perspectives, i.e. intuitionism and a rational perspective, in order to better 
investigate the antecedents of the ethical decision making stages and unpack the 
concept of moral intuition. 
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This work contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it extends the traditional 
framework about ethical decision making by blending features of the rationalist and 
intuitionist approaches, as we stated above. Secondly, the research develops a 
theoretical model for moral intuition. Thirdly, it enriches the virtue ethics paradigm, 
thanks to the concept of synderesis, which allows for a simultaneous account of both 
intuitional and rational aspects of the ethical decision making process, as explained 
later. 
This study is composed of six sections including this introduction. In the second 
section we illustrate and apply the dual processing theory of human cognition to 
ethical decision making, conceptualizing possible relationships between the rationalist 
and the intuitionist approaches. In the third section, we unpack the notion of moral 
intuition and illustrate its role in the ethical decision making process. Next, we 
introduce the concept of synderesis, providing propositions about its influences on the 
overall ethical decision making process. Finally, we discuss the main findings, 
managerial implications and contributions of this paper, along with its limitations, and 
offer suggestions for future research. 
 
Ethical Decision Making: Traditional and Modern Approaches 
 
Ethical decision making refers to “a process by which individuals use their moral base 
to determine whether a certain issue is right or wrong” (Carlson et al., 2009, p.536; see 
also Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe, 2008). According to Jones (1991), the main 
elements that characterize such a process are moral issues and moral agents; a moral 
issue arises whenever an individual behavior may cause favorable or damaging 
consequences for others; a moral agent is an individual who acknowledges the 
presence of a moral issue and acts according to his/her morality. Business ethics 
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scholars have increasingly studied the relationship between moral issues and moral 
agents in the ethical decision making domain (Bastons, 2008; Melé, 2010; Morales-
Sánchez and Cabello-Medina, 2013). However, traditionally this problem has been 
tackled with an approach that the literature refers to as rationalist, while more recently, 
especially thanks to the emergence of psychological studies about human intuition 
(Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; Haidt, 2001; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), a new 
paradigm has developed, referred to as intuitionist. 
 
The Rationalist Tradition of Ethical Decision Making 
Traditionally, rational cognitive models (see e.g. Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986) have 
been thoroughly used in research on ethical decision making (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon 
and Butterfield, 2005). Particularly, Rest’s four-component model represents an often 
used and mentioned tool to describe ethical decision making (Rest, 1986; Rest and 
Narváez, 1994). In this perspective, the ethical decision making process begins with a 
phase of moral awareness, which is the recognition of a problem involving a moral 
issue. The act of acknowledging the existence of a moral issue represents the outset of 
the ethical decision making process (Jones, 1991; Lewis, 1989). In this initial phase, 
the decision maker ‘frames’ possible decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, p. 
257), thus revealing his/her ‘sensitivity’ toward taking others and their welfare into 
account (Rest and Narváez, 1994, p. 9). This phase is further divided into another two 
sub-processes; the first is the ‘operating’ process of the moral agent’s cognition that 
thinks about possible actions; the second, the ‘predicting’ process, forms ideas about 
potential outcomes (Bastons, 2008, p. 394). After a moral issue is acknowledged, the 
second phase of the process is moral judgment, when the decision maker formulates a 
moral judgment about the ethical dilemma, deciding what has to be considered as 
morally correct (Jones, 1991). Specifically, in this phase the decision maker 
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deliberates, so s/he assigns moral labels, such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, to possible actions 
(Melé, 2010; Morales-Sánchez and Cabello-Medina, 2013). Such a phase results in 
moral judgments that assume “the greatest importance in ethics” (Crossan et al., 2013, 
p. 570). Once the ethical situation has been morally judged, the next phase is moral 
intent. In this phase, the decision maker’s cognition ‘structures’ possible actions 
according to his/her moral principles (Bastons, 2008, p. 394). The moral agent decides 
how to act by prioritizing some moral values above others and being responsible for 
moral consequences (Craft, 2013; Melé, 2005). As a result, moral intent reveals the 
decision maker’s willingness to implement an ethical behavior (Treviño et al., 2006). 
Finally, the fourth phase is moral behavior, which refers to implementing the ethical 
behavior according to the moral agent’s intention (Craft, 2013; Morales-Sánchez and 
Cabello-Medina, 2013). According to Rest (1986, p. 15), moral behavior involves 
coping with impediments, difficulties, fatigue and frustration. Hence, one of the main 
features of the moral behavior phase refers to the decision maker’s persistence in 
implementing an ethical action (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). 
Current positive models relying on Rest’s framework interpret the ethical decision 
making process as completely conscious and controlled by the individual (Crossan et 
al., 2013). In this way, the decision maker intentionally deliberates on moral dilemmas 
and makes a rational choice (Morales-Sánchez and Cabello-Medina, 2013). What 
emerges is the predominant role of intentional, deliberate and rational processes over 
ethical decision making (Haidt, 2001; Weaver et al., 2014). For this reason, with 
different approaches, all these paradigms refer to a ‘global’ process of moral 
reasoning, whose function is “to rationalize and provide clear standards of rational 
justification for directives by which to live the moral life and evaluate the moral 
practices of individuals” (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, p. 308).  
 7
Some authors assert that the ultimate goal of moral reasoning is to re-evaluate the 
decision and then to provide moral justification for and legitimatization of the decision 
maker’s behavior (Sonenshein, 2007; Zhong, 2011). Whatever is considered as the 
main purpose of moral reasoning, an evident call has been made to understand factors 
that may come before the traditional ethical decision making stages or pre-existing 
conditions that may influence such stages (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 
2005; Weaver et al., 2014). Three theories are particularly relevant in such a matter: 
the person-situation interactional framework (Treviño, 1986), the social and 
environmental contingency models (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 
1986), and the moral intensity factor (Jones, 1991). 
Firstly, Treviño’s model (1986) focuses on two classes of factor: individual and 
situational. The former category refers to individual factors pertinent to the decision 
maker’s “experience and circumstances of birth” (Ford and Richardson, 1994, p. 206) 
such as age, education, employment, personality and values, and Machiavellianism 
(Craft, 2013; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). The second category instead refers to 
particular “situational pressures” (Ford and Richardson, 1994, p. 212) that may also 
affect the process. Situational factors include organization and industry characteristics, 
working group and managerial influences, and codes of conduct (O’Fallon and 
Butterfield, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007). These elements are external to the ethical 
decision making process since they represent preconditions which the decision makers 
have to cope with. Ferrell and Gresham’s model (1985) enlarges the set of 
contingencies that may affect the process, especially those related to the decision 
maker’s socio-cultural environment (Jones, 1991). Those contingencies include 
organizational elements such as norms, beliefs and values of social groups, labeled 
‘significant others’, and professional opportunities depending on corporate policy, 
rewards and punishments (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985, pp. 90-92). Finally, Jones 
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(1991) theorizes that the way decision makers respond to a particular moral issue 
depends on the characteristics of the moral issue itself – a characteristic called “moral 
intensity” (p. 372). Specifically, the perceived moral intensity of an issue raises the 
level of attention that the decision maker dedicates to the problem (O’Fallon and 
Butterfield, 2005). 
What emerges from such models is that both personal and environmental factors 
impact on decision makers’ ability to recognize a moral issue, sharpening or 
hampering the whole ethical decision making process (Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 
1991). The whole discussion about the rational approaches of ethical decision making 
is synthesized in Figure 1. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
---------------------------- 
Criticisms of the Rationalist Tradition: The Role of Moral Intuition in Ethical 
Decision Making 
This work follows the theoretical debate about components that precede the ethical 
decision making framework (Craft, 2013; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). The aim of 
this paper is to respond to this call by adopting an integrated framework where both 
the traditional and recent studies of social psychology (e.g. Haidt, 2001; 2007; Haidt 
and Bjorklund, 2008) serve such a purpose. 
Modern psychology literature has started to question the assumption about rationality 
being the principal component of ethical decision making. Haidt’s social intuitionist 
model (2001; 2003a; 2007) represents one of the most prominent criticisms of the 
primacy of rationalist models, thanks to the emphasis on the concept of moral 
intuition. Such a concept is described as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a 
moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any 
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conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or 
inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Interestingly, the adjective ‘affective’ 
denotes the influence of an emotional process within the moral intuition construct. 
Despite both intuitions and emotions concurring in the formation of intuitive moral 
judgments (Haidt, 2003b), the present research is focused on the process of intuiting 
while the discussion about emotions is only instrumental when considering such a 
theoretical analysis. Also, even if closely related, intuitions and emotions pertain to 
different spheres of the sensitive level in the decision-making process, respectively the 
cognitive and appetitive ones (Kim and Johnson, 2013; Wang and Hackett, 2015). In 
general, intuition may appear “at the fringe of consciousness” (Haidt and Bjorklund, 
2008, p. 188; see also Haidt and Joseph, 2004), thus stressing the non-conscious, 
unintentional, and non-deliberative nature of moral intuition.  
Particularly, Haidt’s model (2001) can be included in the broader stream of research 
that adopts what is called the ‘dual processing’ theory of human cognition (Cushman 
et al., 2006; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000). Indeed, the 
modern psychological debate on moral judgment recognizes the traditional, 
‘conscious-reasoning’ perspective (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986) and, in contrast, the 
intuitionist perspective (Haidt, 2001; 2007). According to the former, “people generate 
moral judgments by consciously reasoning over the principles they articulate in moral 
justifications”, while the latter proposes that “moral judgments arise as intuitions 
generated by automatic cognitive processes, and that the primary role of conscious 
reasoning is not to generate moral judgments, but to provide a post hoc basis for a 
moral justification” (Cushman et al., 2006, p. 1082). As a result, moral reasoning is 
seen as a ‘servant’ of moral intuition, offering intentional deliberations and rational 
justification of something that is already present in the subconscious (Weaver et al., 
2014, p. 104). The central claim of intuition theorists is that the moral judgment of 
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decision makers is intuitive and may be more effective than rational information 
processing (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; Haidt, 2001; Zhong, 
2011). 
These claims replicate the dichotomy proposed by the theory of System 1 and System 2 
(Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich and West, 
2000), which individuates two distinct information processing systems. Actually, 
psychological scholars differentiate between the intuitive, reflexive, and automatic 
cognitive processes, named System 1 – also referred to as the ‘experiential system’ 
(Epstein, 1994, p. 710) – and the controlled, reflective, and analytic processes named 
System 2 (Evans, 2008; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Stanovich and West, 2000). 
System 1 includes instinctive behaviors that are innately programmed in human 
cognition and is defined as rapid, parallel and automatic in nature, while System 2 in 
contrast is described as slow, controlled, logical and sequential in nature, thus 
resulting in the human powerful general purpose reasoning system (Evans, 2008; 
Stanovich and West, 2000). Stanovich (2008) recently labeled System 1 with the 
acronym TASS – ‘The Autonomous Set of Systems’ – stressing that these processes 
“respond automatically to triggering stimuli; their execution is not dependent upon 
input from, nor is it under the control of, the analytic processing system (System 2); 
and finally TASS can sometimes execute and provide outputs that are in conflict with 
the results of a simultaneous computation being carried out by System 2” (p. 57). On 
the other hand, System 2 allows conscious information processing systems resulting in 
abstract, hypothetical, and algorithmic thinking (Evans, 2008; Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2002). Actually, these two distinct but simultaneous cognitive processes 
may be in conflict in particular circumstances; this is the case of instinctual behaviors 
that ‘contrast’ an assumption of complete rationality, such as “overeating, or smoking” 
(Evans, 2008, p. 268). The opposite case is also true, where reflection and deliberation 
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may rationally deviate the innate and intuitive ethical propensity of individuals, thus 
resulting in the ‘unintended unethicality’ of decision makers (Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe, 2008, p. 553; see also Palazzo et al., 2013). In line with this, integrated models 
of decision making theorize interactive and iterative relationships between the intuitive 
and rational processes, interpreted as parallel and complementary (Epstein, 1994; 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). Such a perspective has recently been named the 
“spiraling process” in the ethical decision making literature (Woiceshyn, 2011, p. 
312). Hence, the dual processing theory of human cognition theorizes the “two minds 
in one brain” approach (Evans, 2008, p. 268), differentiating between the intuitive, 
automatic, effortless, and unintentional processes, called System 1, and the reasoned, 
deliberative, effortful, and intentional processes, called System 2 (Kahneman, 2003; 
Stanovich and West, 2000).  
Particularly referring to the dual processing theory of social judgment, Evans (2008) 
recently argued that “Intuitive judgments seem to have the System 1 characteristics, 
whereas reflective decision making seems much more like a System 2 process” (p. 
268). Applying such claims to the ethical decision making process, it seems reasonable 
to argue that the rationalist approach would consider moral reasoning as one of the 
processes of System 2, being the cognitive process system that any individual activates 
to evaluate carefully a situation, come up with a conscious and deliberate decision, and 
structure a course of action (Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009; Provis, 2015; Woiceshyn, 
2011). In contrast, intuitive judgment or moral intuition, being unconditional and 
spontaneously triggered, seems to be associated with the automatic reply of System 1 
(see Figure 2). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
---------------------------- 
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Despite purely intuitionist theories being quite categorical, it has been shown that, 
especially in uncertain, dynamic, and fast changing circumstances, decision makers’ 
System 1, which in moral terms is associated to the moral intuition process, becomes 
particularly relevant and effective in forming ethical judgments (Groves et al., 2008; 
Zhong, 2011). However, this current work does not argue that such claims are 
absolutely correct; rather it seems important to acknowledge the role of intuition, as 
well as that of reasoning, in forming moral judgment, and blend these elements into an 
integrated framework, which stresses the significant function of both intuition and 
reasoning in ethical decision making (Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; Sonenshein, 2007; 
Weaver et al., 2014). The integrated model of ethical decision making we are going to 
present considers moral intuition as a pre-stage of the ‘rational’ ethical decision 
making process, and in doing this we are taking into account both intuitionist and 
rationalist approaches in relation to the decision maker’s ethical behavior. 
 
Moral Intuition in Ethical Decision Making 
 
Recent findings reveal that moral intuition, along with the emotional sphere of human 
cognition, plays a significant role in forming intuitive moral judgments (Cushman et 
al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; 2003a). The attempt is to unpack moral 
intuition and deepen the notion of intuitive moral judgment as an integrated model 
(Figure 3) that blends the intuitionist perspective with the traditional rationalist one.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
---------------------------- 
The ‘Intuiting’ Process 
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Firstly, it is necessary to unpack the internal composition of moral intuition building 
on recent literature evidences. Dane and Pratt (2007) stressed a significant distinction 
between the process of intuiting and the outcome of moral intuition (p. 36), adding that 
the whole process is affectively charged (p. 40). Building on this, it is possible to 
unpack moral intuition into two processes, namely intuiting (Dane and Pratt, 2007) 
and emotional processing (Greene et al., 2001), and the resulting outcome called 
affect-laden intuitions (Haidt, 2007). 
Decision makers’ intuiting is a non-conscious cognitive process (Kihlstrom, 1987), 
characterized by speed and fast information processing (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 
2003), able to seize external stimuli and to associate them with cognitive structures in 
a way that is interpretable by the decision maker’s mind schemata (Epstein, 1994). 
Hodgkinson et al. (2008) define intuiting as “an automatic self-process, initiated on the 
basis of explicitly or implicitly perceived cues that operates without effort, intention, 
conscious awareness or deliberative analytical judgments” (p. 14). The authors agree 
with Dane and Pratt’s differentiation (2007) between such a non-conscious process 
and its main outcome, namely intuition. Hence, intuiting may be interpreted as the first 
process of a decision maker’s moral intuition, activated by the immediate, fast, 
effortful, and automatic System 1, through which decision makers seize apparently 
separated external stimuli that are unconsciously re-elaborated in a holistic way 
(Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Kihlstrom, 1987). It is also clear how the intuiting 
process works without any associations with System 2 processes, since it does not 
involve the decision maker’s conscious awareness (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson 
et al., 2008).  
Intuiting acquires relevance in the decision making process mostly in dynamic, 
unclear, and fast-changing contexts, which typically involve managers to ‘cut through’ 
details and information (Hodgkinson et al., 2008, p. 14), take a decision in ambiguous 
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situations with poorly structured problems (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005), and rapidly 
exploit cognitive holistic associations in order to make a judgment (Dane and Pratt, 
2007). 
 
The Role of Emotion in Moral Intuition 
The framework proposed in this research sees emotional processing as the second 
process of moral intuition that comes after the intuiting one and represents an affective 
mediator inclining decision makers toward moral affect-laden intuitions. Actually, 
affects and emotions represent a significant element of analysis in moral judgment and 
ethical decision making research, both in the psychological field (Evans, 2008; Fridja, 
1993; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; 2003b) and the managerial one (Agnihotri et 
al., 2012; Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Kim and Johnson, 2013; Lurie, 2004). 
Traditionally, the debate concerning the role of emotions in human cognition has seen 
two different perspectives: firstly, the separation between emotion and reasoning 
(Zajonc, 1984), labeling the former as ‘emotional unconscious’ (Greene et al., 2001; 
Kihlstrom et al., 2000). An opposite view instead sees possible the integration between 
emotion and reasoning, traditionally attributed to Lazarus (1984). The author interprets 
emotions as a result of reasoning and, therefore, as integral parts of it. Such a 
perspective may help in understanding the role of emotions as secondary and often 
detrimental to the decision making process in general, and in the ethical debate 
consequentially (for an extensive review see Fridja, 1993; Haidt, 2003b; Kihlstrom et 
al., 2000). However, the modern psychological debate tends to mitigate such division, 
proposing models that follow the dual nature of the cognitive system. Particularly, 
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) theorize a differentiation between the “hot emotional 
system”, called the ‘go’ system, and the “cool cognitive system”, defined as the 
‘know’ one (p. 4). While the former shares the System 1 features, being reflexive, fast, 
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and simple, the latter shares the System 2 characteristics, namely reflection, self-
control, and slowness (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008). Hence, it is possible to recognize 
the existence of a ‘hot’ emotive system, which is “specialized for quick emotional 
processing”, and of a ‘cool’ system “specialized for complex spatiotemporal and 
episodic representation and thought” (Haidt, 2001, p. 823). Only basic emotions such 
as happiness, sadness, anger, surprise and anxiety are parts of the ‘hot’ system; more 
complex emotions such as desire, disgust, jealousy and empathy instead affect the 
higher-order reasoning, or in other words, the rational reasoning (Haidt, 2003b; 
Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Notwithstanding the influence that emotions have on 
ethical decision making, emotions will be interpreted only as an affective mediator of 
both the intuitive and rational moral judgment. 
The proposed integrated model of ethical decision making fits well with such a 
perspective, proposing that the intuitive ability of the decision maker to perceive, 
reconstruct and evaluate moral issues related to the ethical dilemma, largely depends 
on his/her emotional processing capacity that represents the affective component of 
intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007). In particular, the emotional processing is a significant 
mediator function played by affects and emotions channeling decision makers’ 
intuiting toward affectively charged intuitions (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001). This 
emotional processing encapsulates the experiential state of the decision maker during 
the actual circumstances, therefore playing a significant role in determining intuitive 
moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001; Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009; Whitaker and 
Godwin, 2013). For the purpose of a blended model of ethical decision making, it is 
important to acknowledge the existence of different types of emotions impacting on 
the ethical decision making process, as will be presented clearly in the framework 
later, specifying that emotions affecting the intuitive and instinctual decision making 
process, or moral intuition, belong to the ‘hot’ system. In contrast, emotions of the 
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‘cool’ system affect the rational and deliberative process, or moral reasoning. Thus, 
the emotional channeling in analysis here refers to the basic emotions related to the 
‘hot’ system. 
 
The Intuitive Moral Judgment 
As outcomes of the whole moral intuition process, we have affect-laden intuitions, in a 
more psychological fashion, or intuitive moral judgments, in a more ethical fashion, 
which represent an a priori response that emerges in a fast and automatic way (Haidt, 
2007; Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009) and result from an affectively charging process 
(Dane and Pratt, 2007; Greene et al., 2001). While the two aforementioned processes 
of moral intuition are completely non-conscious, their outcome represented by 
intuitive moral judgments is accessible to the decision maker’s conscious thinking 
(Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008). Such intuitive moral judgments are 
thus the base for an ‘instinctual’ response to a particular situation, usually 
unstructured, unclear and dynamic. As illustrated in Figure 3, intuitive moral 
judgments represent the outcome of moral intuition that will be rationalized by moral 
reasoning. Hence, if the moral issue becomes more structured and definite, the 
analytical and rational processes of System 2 seem more effective in producing an 
ethical judgment and a consequent ethical behavior (Hodgkinson et al., 2008). 
Thus, moral intuition is unpacked in two processes and summarized in Table 1. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 Here 
---------------------------- 
To summarize, moral intuition is the decision maker’s ability to perceive a moral issue 
that, simultaneously and unconsciously, stimulates a reaction according to what are 
perceived as the most appropriate moral principles for the concrete situation 
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(intuiting). This process also depends on emotions caused by the actual events and the 
experiential state of the individual (emotional processing). The resulting outcome is 
represented by intuitive moral judgments that a priori appear in the ethical decision 
making process (affect-laden intuitions). In line with the intuitionist perspective,  this 
research acknowledges that, in particular uncertain and dynamic contingencies, moral 
intuition and its outcomes may directly form a moral judgment, even without the 
rational deliberation of moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Hodgkinson 
et al., 2008; Sonenshein, 2007; Zhong, 2011). However, at the same time, it is also 
true that deliberative and rational decision-making processes need to occur to 
strengthen or correct an intuition. Indeed, it is important to stress that decision makers 
are not “prisoners of their initial intuitions, unable to change their minds once they 
have taken a position” (Haidt, 2003a, p. 197). Accordingly, the research proposes a 
blended and balanced model, taking into account the role of both moral intuition and 
moral reasoning on ethical decision making.   
Finally, a recognition of the existence of moral intuition dispositional factors is 
necessary, especially at the individual level, along with the decision maker’s 
experience, which may trigger moral intuition and the resultant intuitive moral 
judgments (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Dane and Sonenshein, 2014). The framework points 
to the inner dispositions that lead to moral intuition, similarly to the focus of a virtue 
ethics approach. However, a pure virtue ethics approach is not completely applicable, 
since a ‘deliberate’ practice, such as the case of virtues, seems not to be appropriate to 
describe moral intuition, which instead occurs effortlessly. For this reason, an aim of 
the paper is to enrich the virtue ethics perspective thanks to a particular human innate 
habit traditionally associated with the scholastic moral philosophy, known as 
synderesis. This concept, as we will show in the next sections, perfectly suits the 
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moral intuition paradigm and an integrated ethical decision making model, such as the 
one we proposed. 
 
Synderesis in Scholastic Ethics and Moral Philosophy 
 
Scholasticism has represented one of the most important Christian medieval 
philosophies in Europe (for an extensive review see Dierksmeier, 2013; Melé, 2016). 
Recently, Melé (2016) defined the term scholastic as “a method and a system based on 
the rigorous conceptual analysis of different positions and a careful drawing of 
distinctions for a better understanding of questions under consideration” (p. 294). 
Since scholasticism significantly contributed to the evolution of the Catholic school of 
thought, the present research drawing on such a discipline is completely in line with 
the modern Christian approach. Although two great scholastic periods can be traced, 
we draw our analysis from the First Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages 
(Dierksmeier, 2013; Melé; 2016), particularly from the main Franciscan and 
Dominican intellectuals who mostly contributed to the development of the notion of 
synderesis, which is the object of the analysis of the present paper. 
The Christian concept of synderesis has ancient origins rooted in scholastic theory that 
defines it as a practical natural habit (Das Neves and Melé, 2013) and a cognitive 
innate disposition (Greene, 1991; Kärkkäinen, 2012). In this work, a comprehensive 
perspective of this concept is included; it follows the long-lasting tradition of the 
scholastic school (Greene, 1991; 1997; Lottin, 1942; Ojakangas, 2013; Potts, 1980), 
integrating and enlarging the original thoughts of Aquinas (Summa Theologica, 
hereafter S. Th., ed. orig. 1265-1274; 1947). This attempt is made in order to enrich 
the modern debate on ethical decision making by integrating the role of moral intuition 
and moral reasoning in the human cognitive process. Indeed, the research follows a 
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broader definition and notion of synderesis, seen as a natural, innate and affective trait, 
building on the scholastic works of St. Bonaventure (Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ed. 
orig. 1259; 1956) and Jean Gerson (De Theologia Mystica, ed. orig. 1420; 1958) that 
seem to be more in line with the recent psychological research on moral judgment. 
This approach is preferred, rather than a strict adherence to the ‘cognitivist theory’ of 
Aquinas (Gorevan, 2000, p. 141), in order to still use and enlarge the Thomistic 
tradition, which is considered highly valuable and capable to interpret even the most 
recent evidences of the psychological evolution. Such a theoretical building allows this 
work to propose an integrated model that is in line with modern psychological theories 
of moral behavior, particularly the socio-intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001; 2007), which 
stresses the effective role of moral intuition in the ethical decision making process. 
As shown later, in the specific analysis of the concept of synderesis, the analysis used 
a time-spanning lode of scholastic studies in order to define this concept, including 
facets of Aquinas’ original thought. Despite that, a necessary premise seems to be 
required. The perspective adopted in this study assumes synderesis to be an instinctus 
naturae – a divine natural instinct present in every human being – capable of 
providing moral inclination, thanks to the natural law implanted by God in men’s souls 
(for a commentary see Greene, 1997, p. 180; Ojakangas, 2013, p. 53). This 
perspective, specifically derived from the scholastic theory of the thirteenth century, 
provides elements in line with Aquinas’ traditional definition and concept of 
synderesis (S. Th., Ia, q.79, a.12; Ia-IIae, q.94, a.2); however, this research also 
significantly departs from it. More precisely, Aquinas – the most influential 
Dominican intellectual of the First Scholasticism (Melé, 2016) – describes synderesis 
as “the law of our intellect insofar as it is the habit that contains the precepts of natural 
law, that is, the first principles of human actions” (S. Th., Ia-IIae, q.94, a.2). Thus, as in 
the approach adopted in this research, the natural essence of synderesis is extensively 
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present in Aquinas’ thought (Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, hereafter De 
Veritate, ed. orig. 1256-1259; 1972, q.16, a.1, arg.5). The universal principles of law 
are attributed to synderesis, which is consequently interpreted as the natural ability of 
humans to judge (Celano, 2013; Lottin, 1942). Specifically, Lottin (1942) recognizes 
natural law as constituted by the universal principles of morality and synderesis as the 
human innate disposition able to reveal them (p. 569). In the Thomistic perspective, 
synderesis is interpreted in a pure, cognitive way by defining it as a natural habit that 
represents an integral element of the human reasoning process (S. Th., Ia, q.79, a.12), 
which allows the pursuit of moral principles and influences individuals’ ability in 
discerning moral decisions from immoral ones (De Veritate, q.16, a.1, a.2; q. 17, a.1, 
a.2). Aquinas in associating the innate habit of synderesis with the principles of natural 
law was influenced by Philip the Chancellor’s Summa de Bono (1225-1228; 1985), 
one of the first theological treatises on morality, where synderesis is interpreted as a 
component of the highest part of the human soul that “directs human judgments 
toward goodness and away from evil” (Celano, 2013, p. 12; see also Lottin, 1942). 
Particularly, Philip distinguishes synderesis, interpreted as “voluntas naturalis”, from 
human “liberum arbitrium” (free choice), in that the former is naturally directed 
toward good while the latter may be attracted both by moral and immoral choices 
(Summa de Bono, I, 162-167).  
Whereas Aquinas defines synderesis as an intellectual disposition of human beings, 
different interpretations of the concept are especially attributed to the works of St. 
Bonaventure (1956) and Gerson (1958). St. Bonaventure, who is the Franciscan 
intellectual leader of the First Scholasticism (Melé, 2016), associates the term 
synderesis with the notion of instinctus naturae (natural instinct), adding that 
synderesis operates at the affective and emotional level in order to incline man toward 
morality without deliberative efforts (Greene, 1991; Lottin, 1942; Ojakangas, 2013). 
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Hence, St. Bonaventure (In Quartum Librum Sententiarum, ed orig. 1259; 1889) 
defines synderesis as an affective habit of the natural will, reinterpreting Lombard’s 
seminal definition (Liber Primus Sententiarum, ed. orig. 1152; 2007) of the term, 
which refers to man’s will being naturally inclined toward morality (Potts, 1980).  
Building on Bonaventure’s definition, Greene (1997) states, “So synderesis has now 
become the term for that involuntary orientation and movement of the natural will in 
the affective part of man’s soul” (p. 187; see also Ojakangas, 2013 and Potts, 1980). 
Accordingly, Gerson (1958) interprets synderesis as an instinct that comes directly 
from God and inclines humans toward morality, specifically defining synderesis as a 
human “ineradicable instinct (instinctus indelebilis)” (Ojakangas, 2013, p. 54). Gerson 
differentiates between cognitive and affective human powers and collocates synderesis 
at the top of affective powers, defining it as an instinctus naturalis in boni (natural 
instinct for good) (Greene, 1997, p. 190); however, such an interpretation of 
synderesis is largely accepted – even in previous studies. For example, in support of 
this claim is the position of the scholastic theologian Thomas Gallus (Commentary on 
Isaiah, ca. 1218; for a commentary see Javelet, 1961) who clearly separates human 
intellectus (intellect) from affectus (affection) and, in doing so, associates synderesis 
with the notion of principalis affectio (main affection) (Javelet, 1961, p. 289). Hence, 
the interpretation adopted here about the nature of synderesis is in accordance with 
this latter perspective; synderesis is considered to be an ‘instinct’ rather than a 
deliberative process as with the original Aquinas thought. 
Building on scholastic theories that stress the affective, natural and innate features of 
synderesis, the next sections highlight how such a concept of the Christian tradition 
can be perfectly blended in an ethical decision making model by considering both 
moral intuition and moral reasoning. 
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Synderesis as Innate Inclination toward Moral Intuition 
Synderesis has an important role in Christian tradition, as its origin demonstrates. The 
first appearance of the term refers to Saint Jerome who in the year 415 cited this word 
in his Commentary on Ezekiel’s vision of four creatures with different faces, namely a 
human, a lion, an ox, and an eagle, supporting the divine throne (Lombard, 2007; for a 
review see Langston, 1993; 2011). The Saint associates synderesis with the eagle 
representing the spark of human reason and revealing “the candle of the Lord” that 
allows moral discernment (Greene, 1991, p. 196; see also Greene, 1997 and 
Kärkkäinen, 2012). Actually, among medieval scholastic theologians, this 
interpretation is recurrent and synderesis is the scintilla rationis (spark of reason) 
related to a natural inclination of human beings toward intuitively discerning the 
correct act (Greene, 1991; 1997; Lottin, 1942; Potts, 1980). This is possible thanks to 
the principles of the natural law imprinted, for the tradition, in the soul of each 
individual (Bonaventure, 1956; Lombard, 2007). According to these early scholastic 
constructs, the concept of synderesis highlights its main feature, i.e. innate nature 
(Greene, 1991; 1997). 
This element is perfectly in line with the characteristics previously attributed to 
System 1 and so to moral intuition. Thus, synderesis seems reasonably the ‘correct’ 
natural habit used during the process of moral intuition; in other words: synderesis is 
the correct habit that regulates intuition due to its innate nature and it is present in 
every individual. 
 
Synderesis as the Catalyst of Intuitive Moral Judgments 
In the late Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, the relationship between the 
innate natural habit of synderesis and human moral behavior received widespread 
attention (Greene, 1991; 1997; Kärkkäinen, 2012). For Gerson (1958), synderesis is a 
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guiding ability of human cognition toward moral principles (Green, 1991). Similarly, 
the Thomistic philosopher Peyligk, in Philosophie naturalis compendium (1499), 
interprets synderesis as an affective disposition that follows universal moral principles, 
thus inclining human behavior toward good (Kärkkäinen, 2012). This role of 
synderesis, which in such a perspective is assimilated to human natural law, inclines 
human behavior toward moral evaluation and moral decision (Greene, 1997). Also 
Martin Luther (Dictata Super Psalterium ed. orig. 1515; 1964), with a completely 
different ontology, sees synderesis as a human cognitive ability to avoid immoral 
decisions, thus aiming at the most morally correct behavior. 
The common ground of all these interpretations is that synderesis inclines decision 
makers’ cognition toward moral judgment without what today would be called a 
proper process of rational deliberation; it allows “the immediate grasp of concrete 
reality” without conscious reasoning (Liebert, 2008, p. 74). Hence, this Christian 
concept seems to be in line with the recent social intuitionist model that indeed 
attributes to moral intuition an a priori cognitive function influencing post hoc moral 
reasoning. Such an aspect of synderesis is extremely relevant to the present 
conceptualization; in particular situations, i.e. dynamic and uncertain conditions, 
thanks to synderesis the intuitive moral judgment made by moral intuition – even 
without a deliberate process – can result as being rightful. This concept can be further 
discussed; considering synderesis as capable of conferring rightful connotations to 
moral intuitive judgments would imply that even without a deliberate effort these 
judgments are ‘embryonically’ or ‘primordially’ inclined toward goodness. Thus: 
synderesis renders rightful the intuitive moral judgment even without a deliberative 
cognitive effort. 
 
Synderesis as an Antecedent of the Ethical Decision Making Process 
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Commonly, synderesis is seen as a trustworthy part of the soul, a kind of primal 
conscience able to predispose to goodness (for a review of this interpretation see 
Benedict XVI, On Conscience, 2007). Similarly, in a more managerial fashion, Das 
Neves and Melé (2013, pp. 773-776) argue that synderesis refers to the innate natural 
cognitive habit that allows decision makers to seek moral behavior, make moral 
judgments, and reject evil temptations. 
Synderesis, as already shown in medieval interpretations, is an innate ability to readily 
discern the natural law principles. However, the natural law by its nature is the 
primordial imprinting given by God to the human soul to be prone instinctively 
(innately) to goodness (Das Neves and Melé, 2013). Thus, the natural law is a 
universal truth that is utterly trustworthy, and its moral principles indicated by 
synderesis are infallible (De Veritate, q.16, a.2; q.17, a.2). However, this broad 
interpretation requires a more specific discussion about synderesis to avoid confusion 
and overlap with other concepts still related to ethical decision making. The first 
differentiation is with conscience, “synderesis grasps the basic moral principles which 
are the first premises of practical reasoning, while conscientia (conscience) is the 
conclusion, the act of judging that one ought to perform a particular action” 
(Korsgaard, 2013, p. 110). In addition, Dierksmeier and Celano (2012) also argue that 
synderesis represents a perpetual human moral principle constantly inclining toward 
rectitude, a concept also found in the thoughts of Aquinas (Scriptum super Libros 
Sententiarum, ed. orig. 1254-1256; 2000, II, d.24, q.3, a.3). This aspect differentiates 
synderesis from individual conscience that can be obstructed by faulty moral 
reasoning (Korsgaard, 2013). On the same level, Verplaetse (2009) also stresses the 
difference between synderesis, considered as the infallible divine precept present in 
every individual, and conscience, interpreted as the application of that infallible set of 
principles that may result in immoral behavior caused by misleading reasoning. 
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Whether or not these approaches are completely to be espoused, the common and 
relevant aspect for this research is that synderesis is the habit that precedes the 
cognitive stage of moral reasoning. Yet, synderesis seems to suit a ‘balanced’ 
framework that integrates both the rationalist and intuitionalist approach. As premised 
in the previous paragraph, synderesis confers rightful contents to intuitive moral 
judgments; such ‘judgments’ are also used in the formal or rational processes of moral 
reasoning. Hence, it is possible to summarize that: synderesis is an antecedent of the 
ethical decision making process, giving the rightful base from which to develop a 
complete moral decision.  
 
Synderesis as an Innate and Acquired Habit: The Dual Nature of Synderesis 
The previous sections showed how i) synderesis as an innate habit is the correct basis 
that can be applied to moral intuition; ii) synderesis confers rightful connotations to 
intuitive moral judgments without a deliberative effort; and iii) synderesis is 
considered to be an antecedent of moral reasoning. However, synderesis does not only 
‘offer bases’ for moral reasoning, it concretely contributes to reasoning’s perfection.  
In order to apply such a scholastic notion to an integrated framework that attempts to 
combine the intuitionist and rationalist perspectives, the research specifically refers to 
the Dominican theologian John Poinsot (Tractatus de Signis, ed. orig. 1632; 1985). 
Poinsot, in his discussion about the ‘natural’ and ‘acquired’ aspects of synderesis 
habitus (habits), describes them as “partim acquisiti, partim naturales” (partially 
acquired, partially natural) (Forlivesi, 1993, p. 398). Despite the fact that such a 
differentiation does not emerge in the original thoughts of Aquinas, the Saint already 
theorized some kind of seminal elaboration on this topic by separating the ‘affective 
knowledge’, called per quandam connaturalitatem (on account of connaturality), from 
the knowledge called per modum cognitionis (on account of reason) (S. Th., IIa-IIae, 
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q.45, a.2). According to Smith (1998), “Aquinas argues regarding the first principles 
of prudential practice that they are known to us ‘by nature’, that they are ‘connatural to 
us’ (connaturalia homini), and that they can be known by ‘natural temperament’ 
(naturali dispositione)” (p. 38). Building on this differentiation, Poinsot (1985) 
interprets synderesis, firstly, as a natural human habit naturally inclined toward deep-
rooted moral principles of the natural law that intuitively disposes toward correct and 
moral judgment, what can be called innate synderesis. Secondly, synderesis is also an 
acquired faculty that, according to environmental and experiential factors, is 
assimilated by the individual’s reasoning. This acquired faculty ‘pushes’ the rational 
reasoning toward correct behaviors (Forlivesi, 1993). This second dimension, which 
we call acquired synderesis, is not fully natural, despite the principles to which it 
refers being universally true (natural law). In this regard, acquired synderesis requires 
an effortful and continuous engagement toward finding moral principles, and needs to 
be practiced at any occurrence, similarly to the traditional definition of virtue 
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, hereafter NE, VI, 5, 1138b24ff; 1998). 
Innate synderesis in the model presented, which wants to include the intuitionist 
approach in ethical decision making, plays a major role and it has been thoroughly 
examined in the previous discussion. However, we cannot deny the fact that 
synderesis, the acquired one this time, may also influence moral reasoning directly, 
inclining it toward goodness. In a concise way, firstly: the natural habit of synderesis 
or innate synderesis is a pre-rational cognitive disposition that helps intuition by 
taking into account universal moral principles. Secondly: the acquired habit of 
synderesis or acquired synderesis inclines the rational cognitive process toward good, 
so that the rational deliberation does not draw away from universal moral principles. 
 
The Role of Synderesis in the Dual Processing Model of Ethical Decision Making 
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After we built the set of considerations about synderesis by drawing upon scholastic 
moral philosophy (Bonaventure, 1956; Gerson, 1958; Poinsot, 1985), blending them 
with recent psychological approaches (Haidt, 2001; 2007; Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008), 
we propose an integrated model of ethical decision making highlighting the role of 
synderesis (Figure 4). We will illustrate how, firstly, synderesis in its ‘innate’ part may 
represent the initial input in forming a spontaneous and instinctive intuitive moral 
judgment and, secondly, synderesis in its ‘acquired’ part is a significant influencing 
element for the moral reasoning phase. In the next sections we will give a full account 
of the links and influences that synderesis has on the whole ethical decision making 
process, both on moral intuition and its elements, i.e. intuiting, emotional processing 
and affect-laden intuitions, and on moral reasoning. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
---------------------------- 
 
The Role of Synderesis in Moral Intuition 
The fundamental function of innate synderesis, interpreted as an innate human habit, is 
to facilitate and prompt ethical decision making in order to let the decision maker 
immediately discern ethical from unethical behaviors. Synderesis reflects well the 
essence of Christian ethics that prescribes the moral standards decision makers have to 
follow in order to discern between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ (Kim et al., 2009, p. 119). As a 
result, we may argue that synderesis supports ethical decision making in a business 
context, fostering a moral disposition toward good behaviors. 
As shown in Figure 4, the innate synderesis triggers moral intuition. Specifically, the 
role of synderesis refers to the ability to balance both intuiting and emotional 
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processing, i.e. the two processes of moral intuition. Specifically, innate synderesis 
shapes the decision maker’s rapid and unconscious intuiting that represents the first 
process of moral intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Hodgkinson et al., 
2008). As we said, the intuiting process of decision makers is a fast and reflexive 
process that automatically appears in consciousness (Dane and Pratt, 2007). Since 
synderesis seems to trigger practical reason (Das Neves and Melé, 2013), at an 
unconscious level it enriches the decision maker’s intuitive system. The concrete 
situation in which a moral issue takes place impacts on the experiential system of the 
decision maker (Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009; Whitaker 
and Godwin, 2013) and, regarding the intuiting process, we may argue that innate 
synderesis facilitates a continuous, increasing reception of external stimuli present in a 
moral issue. Although an unconditional process, intuiting imprints the experiential 
system of the decision maker who will feel an easiness/uneasiness in performing such 
an act. Thus, innate synderesis due to its intrinsic nature and being the ‘spark of 
conscience’ (Celano, 2013; Greene 1991; Langston, 1993) can be a reasonable 
element to strengthen the experience toward critically ‘assessing’ the situation and 
increasing the reception of external stimuli within the situation. Hence, we propose 
that: 
Proposition 1: Innate synderesis impacts on the decision maker’s unconscious 
cognitive process of intuiting by promptly predisposing the intuitive reception 
of external stimuli toward morality. 
 
Once the intuiting process is accomplished, the next process refers to the emotional 
processing of the decision maker’s moral intuition (Greene et al., 2001). The innate 
synderesis is crucial in emotionally channeling moral intuition. Depending on the 
emotional state of the decision maker, opposite feelings such as happiness and anger, 
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or any other emotion belonging to the ‘hot’ system (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999), may 
alter the reception of signals and limit the spectrum of information available in that 
particular moment (Haidt, 2001; 2003b). As argued by Whitaker and Godwin (2013), 
“fearful individuals favor deliberation and safety, whereas anger leads to less analysis 
and more risk-taking” (p. 63). Thus, decision makers’ feelings notably affect the 
evaluative process (Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009). Instead, innate synderesis firmly 
leads the decision maker’s intuiting toward universal truth and moral principles, 
thereby regulating possible excessive emotional reactions. Psychological research 
would support such a claim, referring to the fact that emotions and intuition are linked 
one to another thanks to the experiential system (Dane and Sonenshein, 2014; Epstein, 
1994). Hence, in such a cognitive area, emotionally significant experiences influence 
the decision maker’s moral intuition, reflecting prior social events and past learning 
that morally affected the individual information processing systems. 
So, innate synderesis, in framing the experience of the intuiting toward the goodness 
thanks to a balanced emotional channeling process, attenuates dystonic learning loops. 
We propose that: 
Proposition 2: Innate synderesis attenuates the decision maker’s altered 
emotive condition, due to the most basic emotions associated with the intuitive 
cognitive system, by regulating possible variations of his/her experiential state 
in order to channel the emotional processing toward pure moral principles. 
 
The Role of Synderesis in Intuitive Moral Judgments 
The main results of moral intuition are intuitive moral judgments (Dane and Pratt, 
2007; Haidt, 2001), interpreted as rapid responses to the ethical dilemma a decision 
maker has to tackle. These judgments are affect-laden intuitions (Haidt, 2007) as a 
result of emotions, feelings, past and current experience, and environmental factors 
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that meaningfully impact on the decision maker’s cognitive moral development 
(Groves et al., 2008; Kohlberg, 1969; Marquardt and Hoeger, 2009). Innate synderesis 
firstly allows the decision maker to channel external stimuli and his/her affective 
emotions toward an ethical decision; secondly, innate synderesis allows decision 
makers to respond according to appropriate moral principles for a particular situation, 
thus disentangling moral dilemmas and forming the resulting affect-laden intuitions. 
We acknowledge the fact that this process is mostly unconscious (Dane and Pratt, 
2007; Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Kahneman, 2003), so cannot be handled by the 
decision maker personally but only through an experiential learning circle that, only at 
a later stage, becomes ‘familiar’ to the cognitive structure (Dane and Sonenshein, 
2014; Epstein, 1994).  
We argue that the main result of intuitive moral judgment is the decision maker’s 
‘moral labeling’ of the particular situation, exactly as traditional frameworks stress for 
Rest’s moral judgment (Morales-Sánchez and Cabello-Medina, 2013, p. 718). Also, 
innate synderesis, as the antecedent of moral reasoning, regulates the right ‘use’ of 
intuitive moral judgments. It fosters the balancing of the whole ethical decision 
making process, avoiding an excessive reliance only on intuitive moral judgments that 
“can lead to injudicious ethical decision making without careful consideration of 
rational information sources” (Groves et al., 2008, p. 307).  
Hence, the following proposition can be made: 
Proposition 3: Innate synderesis inclines the decision maker’s intuitive moral 
judgments toward morality by attenuating possible distortions caused by an 
excessive reliance on intuitional processes. 
 
Synderesis fits perfectly into a dual model where both of the processes, i.e. moral 
intuition and reasoning, are included. In other words, synderesis also fosters decision 
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makers’ moral reasoning inputs. However, we want to stress that in uncertain, 
dynamic and equivocal contexts that characterize the modern business scenario 
(Groves et al., 2008; Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015), the role of automatic and rapid 
moral evaluations represents a significant element (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Weaver et 
al., 2014). For this reason, it is important to refer to the connotation of morality that 
already intuitive moral judgments have, since this may be the only base used in such 
circumstances. 
 
The Role of Synderesis in Moral Reasoning  
Building on the social intuitionist approach, in our integrated model the cognitive 
functioning of moral reasoning is positioned after moral intuition’s main outcome, 
namely intuitive moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; 2007), as shown in Figure 3. Hence, 
moral reasoning is interpreted as a post hoc process that works with a conscious, 
deliberative, and intentional effort (Provis, 2015; Weaver et al., 2014; Zhong, 2011). 
However, it is important to stress that our model does not want to convey the idea that 
moral reasoning is only an instrument to ‘rationalize’ intuition, or that it has a 
subsidiary role. We are instead supporting the fact that, as antecedents to moral 
reasoning, there exists some kind of natural intuition of the ethical dilemmas, but at 
the same time we fully acknowledge the substantial role of moral reasoning in better 
elaborating and processing an intuitive moral judgment, or even rectifying it. 
The aim of moral reasoning is to follow predetermined moral principles so as to 
address the moral issue of the actual situation faced by the decision maker (Buchholz 
and Rosenthal, 2005). As a result, the main function of moral reasoning is firstly to 
evaluate the dilemma analytically and rationally, and later provide moral justification 
for the chosen behavior. At this stage, the decision maker’s acquired synderesis, 
interpreted as a human cognitive faculty resulting from past and current experiences 
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and environmental influences, allows the avoidance of excessively rational 
deliberations that could lead to insensitive analysis and erroneous calculations at the 
expense of the ethical decision making process (Groves et al., 2008). Indeed, acquired 
synderesis impacts on the argumentative rational justification of the decision maker’s 
moral reasoning, weakening the insensitive deviations (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 
2005). The function of acquired synderesis is to incline moral reasoning and ethical 
behaviors toward goodness, if distortions of some post hoc reflections have occurred 
for any reason, pointing back to the process of the natural principles that synderesis is 
innately predisposed to find. In this way, re-evaluations and examinations of moral 
reasoning are morally balanced by the decision maker’s acquired synderesis. As a 
result, we argue that: 
Proposition 4: Acquired synderesis controls possible distortive rationalization 
of the ethical decision making thanks to elevating the individual justification 
from an argumentative level to a genuinely moral one, assuring the 
acknowledgment of universal moral principles. 
 
Finally, in such a deliberative phase, it is important to recognize another role of 
acquired synderesis which consists of controlling the emotions influencing the rational 
sphere of human cognition, i.e. what we previously refer to as belonging to the ‘cool’ 
system (Evans, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Particularly, such a 
system is affected by emotions that literature has defined as ‘moral’, which play a 
significant role in forming moral judgment and ethical behavior (Haidt, 2003b). Haidt 
(2003b) labels as ‘moral’ those “emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare 
either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (p. 
853). 
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The ‘hot-cool’ theory of emotion (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999) is in line with the 
original conceptualization of Thomas Aquinas on the topic (S. Th., Ia-IIae, q. 22, a. 1; 
see also King, 1999). Particularly, Aquinas recognizes the existence of sensitive and 
intellective parts of the soul, both of which have cognitive and appetitive principles (S. 
Th., Ia-IIae, q. 26, a. 1), and thus also two different types of human will that oversee the 
appetites. The voluntas ut natura (natural will) denotes a spontaneous will of the 
decision maker toward bonum (good), while the voluntas ut ratio (rational will) refers 
to a deliberative decision making process toward verum (truth) (S. Th., IIIa, q.18, a.4). 
Actually, it is possible to say that the natural will corresponds to the process of 
handling ‘sensitive emotions’, denoting a spontaneous and natural inclination of 
human will toward morality, well exemplified by the love of God that may produce a 
natural inclination toward moral knowledge (S. Th., Ia, q.1, a.6). In contrast, the 
rational will deal with ‘rational emotions’ influencing the cognitive inclination of 
human will toward the truth (Gorevan, 2000; King, 1999). The present interpretation 
therefore sees sensitive emotions as basic emotions associated with the ‘hot’ system 
that takes place in System 1, while rational emotions as higher-order reasoning 
emotions are associated with the ‘cool’ system that takes place in System 2 (Evans, 
2008; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). We also know that emotions may have a negative 
effect on moral reasoning, in line with Aquinas’ interpretation of passions as 
‘obstacles’ that ‘pervert’ human reason (S. Th., Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 4). The significant role 
of acquired synderesis refers to preventing the possible ‘clouding’ of a decision 
maker’s ethical judgment being the scintilla rationis – ‘spark’ of conscience 
(Lombard, 2007) – that gives the rightful base for a deliberative cognitive effort 
directed toward moral discernment (Bonaventure, 1956; Gerson, 1958). 
Also in the literature about ethical decision making, increasing attention has been 
dedicated to the impact of emotions on moral reasoning (Agnihotri et al., 2012; 
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Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Lurie, 2004). Gaudine and Thorne (2001), for example, 
theorize a ‘cognitive-affective’ model recognizing positive impacts on all the four 
stages, i.e. moral awareness, moral judgment, moral intent, and moral behavior. Other 
researches similarly reveal how instead some emotions seem to be more impactful on 
some moral stages than on others (Agnihotri et al., 2012; Lurie, 2004). According to 
Melé (2005), positive emotions such as compassion, solidarity, and sympathy, but also 
negative emotions such as greed and self-sufficiency, significantly impact on the 
decision maker’s awareness of a moral issue. Such emotions working at the rational 
level are labeled ‘moral sentiments’ (Melé, 2005, p. 104), which differ from the 
sensitive basic emotions working in the intuitive ‘hot’ system described above.  
This allows us to extend the original Thomistic thought toward an integrated ethical 
decision making framework, which also considers both kinds of emotion and their 
roles in respect to moral intuition and moral reasoning. To summarize: 
Proposition 5: Acquired synderesis prevents emotions, i.e. those that are more 
sophisticated and associated with the deliberative cognitive system, from 
clouding the rational evaluation of moral dilemmas by redirecting the rational 
process to the ultimate state of truth.  
 
The Employability of the concept of Synderesis in a Dual Processing Model  
This distinctive nature of synderesis makes it a unique approach for analyzing the 
ethical decision making process through a dual perspective, i.e. integrating intuitionist 
and rationalist perspectives. We offer a brief explanation of such a claim, showing the 
drawbacks of other traditional, ethical paradigms used in the ethical decision making 
literature, i.e. utilitarianism, universalism and (purely) virtue ethics (Koehn, 1995). 
According to the utilitarian rationale, decision makers evaluate and choose the 
alternatives depending on the expected effects, thus enhancing their satisfaction/utility 
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(Kim et al., 2009). Despite the different sophistications of the utilitarian approach, a 
common element of all these theories is that the agent is rational and able to evaluate 
the situation and its outcome. Definitely, such requisites are not met by talking about 
intuition, especially the ability to forecast and choose the preferable outcomes. 
Conversely, universalism imposes that every act is performed according to general and 
transcendental moral principles (Kant, Foundations of the metaphysics of morals, ed. 
orig. 1785; 1959). So, from this perspective, the traditional way to exert a decision 
making process is through applying universal concepts to the particularities of reality, 
i.e. the determinant judgment (Kant, Critique of Judgment, ed. orig. 1790; 1914; 5: 
386-389). However, another kind of judgment is also present, i.e. reflective judgment, 
where peculiarities of reality are connected with universal concepts given by pure 
reason. This form of judgment may suit the intuition process more; however, as Kant 
(1914) himself declares, a reflective judgment is carried out through confrontation and 
dialectics and again this connotation does not completely suit an instinctive process. 
Finally, virtue ethics refer to specific human qualities, or virtues that are dispositions 
acquired, exercised, and instructed by moral actions (Crossan et al., 2013; Melé, 
2005). Our approach actually draws really close to the virtue ethics paradigm; 
however, a strict application of that paradigm would imply asserting that intuition 
needs to be exerted in an effortful way. While we may agree that even this 
unconscious process can be sharpened to some extent, nevertheless it will never be 
completely under control – as a proper virtue or moral habit would require. However, 
our elaboration of synderesis better suits an integrated model. Synderesis is both a 
typically innate and natural human sense, such as moral intuition (Haidt, 2001), and 
partially acquired and partially natural (Forlivesi, 1993; Poinsot, 1985), which satisfies 
the traditional criteria of a ‘proper’ virtue ethics approach, and its virtuous action 
influences the moral reasoning process more. 
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Another consideration to be made is that synderesis, despite having two constituent 
parts, is not a virtue per se. Actually, in line with the Thomistic tradition, we 
acknowledge the fact that in order to be virtuous, the decision making process needs 
moral reasoning. In fact, innate synderesis regulates the intuitive process and in this 
way offers an embryonic intuitive moral judgment inclined toward goodness. We are 
claiming that this basic moral, natural and innate intuition of morality is ‘intrinsically’ 
connatural in all human beings (Dierksmeier and Celano, 2012), and also in 
accordance with the scholastic thoughts of Bonaventure (1956) and Gerson (1958). 
However, in order to act completely virtuously, this natural inclination is not enough; 
it is necessary to have the support of all the other cardinal virtues (S. Th., Ia-IIae, q.61, 
a.1). For example, without practical reason such good initial intuition can be translated 
into careless behaviors, or without fortitude the planned and intended behaviors can be 
weakened by the harshness of contingencies. Thus, for all these reasons, synderesis is 
able to give moral content to intuition but this is only what we can call a ‘moral 
premise’ that does not necessarily lead to virtuous behaviors. However, it is also true 
that, without such a universal innate ability oriented toward goodness, the possibility 
of being virtuous would be much more impaired. Yet, neglecting the naturally and 
innate inclination toward the morality of human beings would imply a dangerous 
assumption about human nature seen as innately sterile, if not worse, i.e. wicked, 
opening up for a dangerously moral relativism or situationalism (Lewis, 1989). 
Probably a much better assumption would be to consider synderesis as the habit that to 
some extent contributes to what the Ancient Greeks would refer to as enkrateia, which 
means ‘continence or self-mastery’ (NE, VII, 8, 1151a27-28; see also Arjoon, 2008). 
Such a state is related to a situation in which the decision maker, despite appetites and 
emotions, is able to act according reason, thus reaching a moral behavior even without 
the intervention of a virtuous process (Arjoon, 2008, p. 228). We admit that enkratic 
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people in this perspective are seen as rationalist agents but, as we stressed many times 
within this work, our principal aim is to give theoretical foundations to the last 
evolutions of psychology by highlighting the significant role of moral intuition for an 
integrated ethical decision making process. Thus, synderesis leads to self-mastery 
(enkrateia) as far as it regulates emotions and instincts, particularly the most irrational 
and ‘eruptive’ of the ‘hot’ system during the intuitive phase (innate synderesis). At the 
same time, during the ‘rational’ process, it preserves the decision maker’s cognitive 
process from distortions that would deviate reasoning from moral judgment and 
behavior (acquired synderesis).  
Specifically in relation to the virtue of practical reasoning, the ‘acquired’ feature of 
synderesis (Poinsot, 1985) – which constantly reminds of innate moral contents during 
moral reasoning – seems able to facilitate the application of such a virtue to a potential 
or virtual status. This is a premise for an executive habitus that, finally, implies a 
virtuous behavior. Decision makers unconsciously elaborate intuitive moral judgment, 
as we said through innate synderesis, whenever there is a moral issue to be discerned. 
However, thanks to the habit of acquired synderesis, also a ‘routinization’ of such 
judgments occurs. Thus, acquired synderesis facilitates a particular form of moral 
common sense, namely synesis, which, according to Aquinas, is one of the potential 
parts of practical reason – along with eubolia and gnome – rightly able to judge in 
ordinary cases (S. Th., IIae-IIae, q.51, a.3, a.4; Pellegrini and Ciappei, 2015). As a 
result, the constant natural inclination toward good of innate synderesis may become a 
potential virtuous practice thanks to its ‘acquired’ element, which functions as an 
elicitor of synesis and its judgment in ordinary cases where the discernment follows 
known paths. Although this discussion about synderesis and practical reason is only 
embryonic and beyond the scope of the present paper, it could be an interesting avenue 
for future developments.  
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Implications for Managers 
 
The decision maker’s moral reasoning has to be continuously overhauled for what 
Benedict XVI referred to as “ethical blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power 
and special interests” (Deus Caritas Est, 28, a, 2005). Palazzo et al. (2013) define 
ethical blindness as “the temporary inability of a decision maker to see the ethical 
dimension of a decision at stake” (p. 325), due to the rational incapacity of accessing 
moral principles that are naturally innate. This is particularly relevant in business 
contexts, where economic, financial and political interests frequently stimulate 
managers’ rational insensitivity to ethical dilemmas (Groves et al., 2008; Tenbrunsel 
and Smith-Crowe, 2008). As previously stated, the main function of moral reasoning 
refers to rationalize, re-examine, and justify decision makers’ moral judgment 
(Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005). Actually, managers’ rational decision making may 
sometimes be excessively characterized by a consequential and preference-based 
attitude that pursues the maximization of individual preferences. Moreover, an 
excessive reliance on utilitarian reasoning about individual benefits may incline 
decision makers toward consequentialism aimed at outcome-based judgment (Kim et 
al., 2009). As a result, consequentialist decision making may induce managers to 
Machiavellianism, defined as “amoral in the sense that the end, which is usually 
winning, is sufficient justification for the means” (Miesing and Preble, 1985, p. 467). 
Hence, managers showing high Machiavellianism may pursue objectives by neglecting 
intuitive moral judgments on behalf of unethical tactics and strategies. Consequently, 
the deliberative sub-process of rational justification present in moral reasoning may 
deviate from managers’ intuitive moral judgments that previously resulted from moral 
intuition. 
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The theoretical insights proposed in this paper seem to be relevant in the modern 
debate related to the reflective practice of ethical reasoning, particularly analyzed in 
managerial education and management development literature (Small and Cullen, 
1995). The traditional framework of ‘reflective thinking’ generally accepted in 
pertinent literature (Schon, 1983), mainly focuses on the rational aspects of human 
cognitive processes. The accent has been prevailingly placed on managers’ awareness 
and perception of a particular issue, which, in moral terms, represents the first 
component of Rest’s rationalist framework (1986) of ethical decision making (moral 
awareness). Traditionally, management development programs provide reflective 
actions such as ‘critical reflection’, ‘reframing’, and ‘unlearning/relearning’ activities, 
through which the educational development of decision makers is improved (Small 
and Cullen, 1995). In this context, moral issues should also represent elements upon 
which the decision maker has to reflect. Precisely, one of the main ‘action points’ that 
our model would like to stimulate refers to the ‘rediscovery’ of intuition and intuitive 
moral judgments when reflecting upon moral issues. In this way, the decision maker 
will reflect and deliberate not only on the moral judgment resulting from the reasoning 
process, but also on the spontaneous intuitive moral judgment resulting from the moral 
intuition phase. The scholastic concept of synderesis actually serves a crucial function 
in this process. This role of synderesis becomes significant when managers, for 
example, focus on economic evaluations, such as in cost/benefit analysis. In such 
circumstances, moral reasoning risks being misled by immoral judgments that result in 
unethical decision making. Hence, one of the main criticalities of ethical decision 
making refers to managers’ misled moral reasoning that may supersede synderesis, 
producing in this way both unethical judgments and behaviors. 
As a result of the above considerations, a ‘rediscovery’ of the idea of moral intuition 
allows managers to reflect on and re-think what their unconscious instinctual response 
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was, and hopefully to ‘re-calibrate’ their judgments on ethical dilemmas. In this way, 
the effectiveness of the whole ethical decision making process should be increased. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The traditional rationalist framework of ethical decision making has been challenged 
by recent psychological and managerial literature, which stresses the importance of 
unconscious elements of decision makers’ cognition, such as intuition and emotions. 
Building on the recent social intuitionist perspective, our discussion led us to interpret 
moral intuition as an antecedent of the ethical decision making process, to be blended 
with the traditional moral reasoning or the deliberative and intentional process. 
Furthermore, we use the scholastic framework to enlarge the virtue ethics approaches. 
Particularly, the scholastic concept of synderesis, thanks to its dual nature, allowed us 
to integrate the innate ability of moral intuition with moral reasoning in the ethical 
decision making framework. 
We recognize that our paper suffers from some limitations, mostly because our 
considerations and propositions are purely theoretical and not supported by empirical 
evidence. For example, an experimental setting could be useful to empirically test the 
assumptions that moral intuition precedes the stages of the ethical decision making 
framework. Concerning future researches, it would be interesting to apply the whole 
socio-intuitionist framework (Haidt, 2001) in a managerial context, thus analyzing 
how social persuasion and social influence link the impact on the ethical decision 
making process. Furthermore, a relevant issue that has not received appropriate 
consideration is what happens when the two cognitive systems of human decision 
making – Systems 1 and 2 –  contrast and how the resulting conflicts may be handled 
by decision makers. Particularly, relevant attention should be given to the role 
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emotions have whenever they are in contrast to individual moral reasoning. Another 
interesting future direction for this work is using our conceptualization of ethical 
decision making in the context of entrepreneurship personality traits (Rauch and Frese, 
2007). Particularly, some features of successful entrepreneurs are innate while others 
are achieved thanks to training and experience. Thus, our model may be employed in 
this field of research in order to better understand how moral intuition is related to 
entrepreneurial performance. 
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